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Abstract Reasoning from a naturalistic perspective, viewing the mind as an evolved 
biological organ with a particular structure and function, a number of in! uential 
philosophers and cognitive scientists claim that science is constrained by human 
nature. How exactly our genetic constitution constrains scienti" c representations of 
the world remains unclear. This is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, it often leads 
to the unwarranted conclusion that we are cognitively closed to certain aspects or 
properties of the world. Secondly, it stands in the way of a nuanced account of the 
relationship between our cognitive and perceptual wiring and scienti" c theory. In 
response, I propose a typology or classi" cation of the diff erent kinds of biological 
constraints and their sources on science. Using Boden’s (1990) notion of a concep-
tual space, I distinguish between constraints relating to the ease with which we can 
reach representations within our conceptual space (which I call ‘biases’) and cons-
traints causing possible representations to fall outside of our conceptual space. This 
last kind of constraints does not entail that some aspects or properties of the world 
cannot be represented by us – as argued by advocates of ‘cognitive closure’ – merely 
that some ways of representing the world are inaccessible to us. It relates to what 
Clark (1986) and Rescher (1990) have framed as ‘the alien scientist hypothesis’ (the 
possibility that alien scientists, endowed with radically diff erent cognitive abilities, 
could produce representations of the world that are unintelligible to us). The pur-
pose of this typology is to provide some much needed clarity and structure to the 
debate about biological constraints on science.
Keywords Cognitive Constraints, Sensory Constraints, Scienti" c Scope, Cognitive 
Scaff olding, Conceptual Space, Cognitive Closure
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1. Introduction
Darwin’s (1859) theory of evolution by natural selection has profound 
consequences for epistemology. It sheds a whole new light on the origin 
and therefore the scope and limits of the human mind. Not only are our 
cognitive faculties the outcome of a contingent evolutionary path, they 
are also shaped to promote survival and reproduction in the particular 
ecological context ancestral Homo sapiens encountered. A far cry from 
the traditional view of the human mind as the God-like organ, partaking 
in universal Rationality. To make matters worse, Darwin (1871) insists 
that the diff erence in mind between human and non-human is but a 
diff erence of degree. What then are we to make of our epistemic pros-
pects? Darwin himself was not optimistic. In a letter to William Graham, 
he expressed the following concern:
“With me the horrid doubt arises whether the convictions of man’s 
mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, 
are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would anyone trust in the convic-
tions of a monkey’s mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?” 
(Darwin 1871).
Since Darwin, a great deal more has been discovered about the human 
mind. The picture that is emerging is that of a highly structured amal-
gam of cognitive sub-systems, each evolved to deal with a set of par-
ticular, recurring problems in our ancestral environment (e.g. Fodor 
1983; Barkow, Tooby and Cosmides 1992; Pinker 1997; Carruthers 
2006). While the extent to which the mind is ‘modular’ or carved up in 
domain-speci" c, informationally encapsulated, autonomous and spe-
cialised sub-systems is still heavily debated, it is unanimously accepted 
that the human mind is an evolved, natural organ with its concomitant 
structure and limits. Epistemic pessimists – such as Fodor (1983), McGinn 
(1994), and Chomsky (2000) – have argued that this entails that our best 
epistemic endeavours, science, must be limited in scope. That, in other 
words, some aspects and properties must in principle remain unknown 
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to us, given the biologically imposed limits of our evolved minds.1 This 
is the so-called ‘cognitive closure’ or ‘epistemic boundedness’ thesis.
In previous work I have argued against the view that biological con-
straints entail cognitive closure (Author’s ref). The fact that our biology 
constrains our epistemic activities does not entail that some aspects and 
properties of the world must remain unknown or unrepresented by us. 
Arguing that it does, con! ates representations (the ways in which we 
represent the world and which are constrained by our biological makeup) 
and objects of representations (the aspects and properties of the world 
which are represented). It is not because there are constraints on the way 
we represent the world that we cannot represent everything there is in 
the world. Moreover, deriving cognitive closure from genetic constraints 
also ignores the myriad of ways in which we scaff old our thinking with 
so-called ‘mind extensions’ (see section 2). We cannot, therefore, gauge 
the scope of our sciences by looking at the limitations of our unassisted 
senses and minds (as the advocates of cognitive closure do). 
This however does not mean that our biology does not constrain our 
sciences (merely that it does not in principle limit what our sciences can 
represent). Con! ating constraints and limits is exactly the fallacy com-
mitted by the advocates of cognitive closure. By ‘constraints’ I refer to 
the fact that our biology steers and frames scienti# c enquiry (see section 
2). ‘Limits’ on the other hand refer to a principled inability to represent 
some aspects of the world. The view that our biology limits our science 
is defended by the advocates of the cognitive closure thesis. The view 
that our biology constrains our science – in the sense de# ned above – 
follows from a naturalistic perspective on human cognitive abilities (and 
is commonly accepted by philosophers of naturalistic ilk). Our genetic 
constitution, meaning the makeup of our senses and cognitive faculties, 
is not irrelevant to our epistemic activities. How our biology aff ects our 
science, however, is not clear from the extant literature. 
1  To be fair, only Fodor (1983) and Chomsky (2000) derive cognitive closure from the 
premise that our mind is an evolved organ with its accompanying structure and limits. 
McGinn (1994) does believe the natural, evolutionary origin of our mind makes it very 
likely that some aspects and properties of the world will elude us, but does off er other 
arguments to support his claim, (such as a mismatch between the way our mind works 
and the structure of allegedly unsolvable problems).
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The aim of this paper is to remedy this by proposing a conceptual 
framework or typology of biological constraints on scienti! c represen-
tations. Such a framework, I hope, will both facilitate the systematic 
study of cognitive and perceptual constraints on human scienti! c rep-
resentations of the world and ward off  hasty and ultimately unfounded 
(pessimistic) conclusions regarding our epistemic prospects. In section 2, 
I look at the ways in which we extend our cognitive scope by using 
external resources. These external levers greatly amplify the conceptual 
space of our (scienti! c) representations. In section 3, I propose a new 
conceptual framework to think about biological constraints on science. In 
section 4 and 5, I # esh out this framework. And in section 6, I conclude.
2. Extending Our Cognitive Scope
In the same way as for any other species on this planet, our genetic 
constitution determines to an important extent the representations we 
form of the world.2 More precisely, it determines the kind of input we 
gather from the world and the way we process this input (Fodor 1983, 
Barkow, Tooby and Cosmides 1992, Carruthers 2006, Boyer 2000). We 
come equipped with a number of senses – each with their particular 
scope and resolution – and a set of intuitions or innate reasoning prin-
ciples underlying the interpretation of this input. This yields a humanly 
shared set of intuitive representational frameworks we impose on (the 
input we gather from) the world, often referred to as ‘folk sciences’ (e.g. 
folk physics, folk biology, and folk psychology). Boyer (2000: 277) calls 
these hard-wired representational frameworks ‘intuitive ontologies’, 
which he describes as ‘a series of category-speci! c intuitive principles 
that constitute an evolved natural metaphysics’. 
The fact that these intuitive (and often implicit) theories about aspects 
of the world are innate is supported by two strands of research. The ! rst 
is developmental psychology. Infants show some basic appreciation of 
physical laws which they could not have gathered from experience. This 
2  By this I do not mean that we can map speci! c genes to (kinds of) representations 
we form of the world, but rather that cognition is grounded in our biology. Much like the 
hardware of a computer determines the way that computer is going to process informa-
tion, the human genetic constitution determines the way our minds process information.
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conclusion emerges from the research of Spelke (1991) and Baillargeon 
(1991) who have designed experiments on 3 to 8 month old children, 
to test their concept of objecthood and the laws that govern their inter-
action. In order to test this, they measure the looking time of the infant 
when confronted with either a possible or an impossible physical event 
(such as, for instance, an object passing through another or an object 
disappearing after being veiled). When infants consider something as an 
impossible physical event, their looking time will be considerably longer 
than when confronted with a possible event, which bores or ‘habituates’ 
them much faster, making them look away (Baillargeon et al, 1995:81). 
In other words, infants reveal their innate representations of the world 
by looking much longer at scenarios that violate their intuitions about 
how the physical world behaves.
The conclusions that emerge from this research is that infants possess 
the concept of objecthood – whatever moves together is considered an 
object – and that they expect these objects to behave in certain ways. 
Infants expect objects to be impenetrable by each other, to move along 
continuous trajectories and to be cohesive. Furthermore, they already 
‘know’ that objects can only move each other by making contact. As 
Pinker (1997) points out, infants see objects, remember them and expect 
them to obey several physical laws. They have an understanding of a 
stable, lawful world, which they could never have acquired by simple 
induction (they are barely able to manipulate objects, they don’t see them 
very well, etc.) or through feedback from anyone else (they obviously 
can’t communicate). Therefore, they must be endowed with an innate 
predisposition to understand physical entities in a particular way (319).
The second strand of research that points at our possession of innate 
theories about certain aspects of our environment is comparative anthro-
pology. People everywhere have deep-rooted intuitions about natural 
kinds, such as animals, plants and minerals. According to Atran (1995, 
1998), we are endowed with a predisposition to think about fauna and 
! ora in a highly structured way. We intuitively classify the organic world 
in a complex taxonomy, based on a hidden trait or essence that mem-
bers of the same group share with each other. Based on these intuited 
essences we divide the natural world into a complex taxonomy which 
incorporates diff erent groups, each further de# ned in diff erent levels of 
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subgroups (e.g. a lion is an animal, a mammal and a cat). Atran argues 
that these taxonomies are widely shared across all cultures and eras, 
and are therefore much less arbitrary than the assembly of, for instance, 
entities in cosmology, artefacts or social groups (1998: 547).
Taken together, the senses and innate reasoning principles we have 
evolved endow us with what Uexküll (1909) has called an ‘Umwelt’. 
A particular realm of awareness in which every species is encapsulated 
as a result of the outcome of its evolutionary history. Humans, neverthe-
less, have transcended their Umwelt (see Author’s ref). Modern science 
has parted ways with most of our intuitive understanding of the world 
and has radically extended the scope we have on the world, as provided 
by our unassisted senses and minds (Wolpert 1992, McCauley 2000). 
Indeed, in science we make use of instruments to observe otherwise 
unobservable macro- and microscopic entities such as, for instance, 
distant galaxies or the cells making up organic tissue. Furthermore, sci-
entists postulate the existence of unobservables – like atoms and elec-
trons – and grasp the causal structures of the physical world by means of 
complex quantitative systems (mathematics), yielding radically diff erent 
representations (e.g. relativity theory) than those produced by our 'bare' 
sensory and cognitive faculties3.
In this regard, Sterelny (2010), following Clark and Chalmers (1997), 
argue that humankind's impressive cognitive feats are primarily the 
product of our ability to extend our minds’ capacity through interact-
ing with our environment, rather than being the product of our internal 
computational engine. Our minds, according to Sterelny (2010: 480), are 
'scaff olded'. They are supported by external, environmental resources 
that radically enhance their cognitive capacity.
These external resources 'scaff olding' human science can roughly be 
divided into three major categories. The " rst is the social aspect of 
human knowledge in general and science in particular. The impressive 
3  By sensory faculties, I mean the " ve senses and the brain processes that interpret 
the input we gather from these senses. By cognitive faculties, I mean the brain processes 
that generate knowledge and understanding. I use the term ‘faculties’ interchangeably 
with ‘wiring’ ‘mechanisms’ and ‘apparatus’ – as in cognitive and perceptual wiring or 
mechanisms and cognitive and sensory apparatus. 
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bodies of knowledge science produces are not the result of the work of 
isolated individuals, but are accumulated over generations. Tomasello 
(2001), in this context, argues that the key cognitive adaptation account-
ing for human culture is humankind's ability to understand conspeci! cs 
as intentional agents just as the self, endowing human beings with 'joint 
attentional skills'. This endows us with ‘powerful forms of cultural learn-
ing, […] allowing human beings to pool their cognitive resources both 
contemporaneously and over historical time in ways that are unique in 
the animal kingdom' (135). 
The second kind of scaff old refers to the 'cognitive artefacts' we develop. 
Such artefacts include logic, a system of formal principles of accurate 
inferences, and mathematics, a system to represent and compute quan-
titative information. Together those artefacts form the backbone of our 
modern sciences. Furthermore, as Dennett (2000: 22) argues, the natural 
languages humankind developed, provide us with the necessary tools to 
'think about thinking'. They enable us, in other words, to represent our 
own representations – i.e. to form metarepresentations.
The third kind, ! nally, refers to the external devices we make use of. 
Notation enables us to store huge amounts of information we could never 
retain by memory. Furthermore, it assists our reasoning, enabling us – for 
instance – to rapidly work out mathematical equations. But it doesn’t stop 
at writing. Over time we produced a plethora of technological detecting 
and measuring instruments (e.g. telescopes, barometers and the like) 
providing us with data we could never gather from the world by means 
of our unassisted senses, as well as computing instruments, enabling 
us to process data in ways we could never do with our unassisted mind.
This endows us with a radically diff erent cognitive relation to the world 
than any other species on earth. In contrast to all other species, we are 
not bound to represent the world in a ! xed set of ways (given that we 
have the ability to override our intuitive perspectives on the world – our 
so-called folk sciences), nor can we derive from our possession of bio-
logical constraints on cognition that some aspects and properties of the 
world must in principle remain unknown to us (given that we cannot pre-
dict what cognitive scaff olds we might in principle ‘construct’, enabling 
us to overcome cognitive limitations), as do advocates of the cognitive 
closure thesis. 
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This open-ended cognitive relation to the world (given that we are 
able to overcome innate species-speci! c representations and ‘freely’ 
construct new representations with new scaff olds) endows us with a 
conceptual space containing an in! nite amount of possible represen-
tations of the world. This however does not mean that science is not 
aff ected by genetic constraints on perception and cognition. The fact 
that science is constrained by our biology has been pointed out by a 
number of in# uential authors. Ruse (1986, 1995) claims that science is 
! rmly rooted in our biology. Our scienti! c endeavours, he explains, still 
# ow through ‘biologically channeled modes of thinking imposed on us 
by evolution’ (Ruse 1986: 149). Lumsden and Wilson (1981: 13) refer to 
this as the ‘leash principle’. ‘Genetic natural selection’, they state, ‘oper-
ates in such a way as to keep culture on a leash'. Rescher (1990: 95), 
! nally, claims that we are endowed with a particular ‘cognitive project’ 
which is ‘the intellectual product characteristic of one particular sort of 
cognitive life-form’.
It is however not clear what exactly those biological or genetic con-
straints on knowledge in general and science in particular are. This 
vagueness plaguing much of the literature dealing with this import-
ant issue, is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, it leads to hasty and 
unfounded conclusions, as the ones made by the advocates of the cog-
nitive closure thesis, who bluntly assert that given the obvious genetic 
constraints on our cognitive activities, some aspects and properties of 
the world must elude us. Secondly, this vagueness prevents us from 
forming a nuanced account of the relationship between our biological 
makeup and the scope and form of our scienti! c theories (and the ways 
in which the former constrains the latter). To remedy this, I propose a 
conceptual framework, drawing from Boden’s (1990) notion of a ‘con-
ceptual space’. This is the subject of the next section.
3. Conceptual Framework
A conceptual space, as Boden (1990: 89) de! nes it, is a space of com-
putational possibilities a system can generate, based on the particular 
set of data (input) it receives and the set of action-rules it can perform 
on these data. Chess, for example, allows for a number of possible 
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board-positions based on a particular set of data – i.e. the diff erent 
pawns and the structure of the board – and action-rules – the rules by 
which those pawns can be moved across the board. Based on these data 
and rules, all possible board positions can be generated. Similarly, the 
conceptual space containing the representations of the world we can in 
principle generate – i.e. the totality of representations that we could in 
theory form of the world – is based on the input we could in principle 
draw from it (the input we gather by means of our senses and the arti" cial 
aids we could in principle produce) and the ways in which we could in 
principle process this input (generated by our cognitive faculties, assisted 
by all the cognitive artefacts and other external resources we could in 
principle develop and use to scaff old our reasoning). 
Every location being determined by a particular input and a particular 
action-rule performed on this input, the ease with which our mind zooms 
in on a location (i.e. a representation in our conceptual space) depends 
both on the ease with which the particular input can be drawn from the 
world and the ease with which a particular action-rule can be performed 
on this input. Regarding the input we can draw from the world, the nature 
of our senses – as I will discuss below – makes some data from the world 
easier to gather than other data. With regards to processing this input, 
our minds – as I will discuss – are predisposed to apply certain reasoning 
patterns (action-rules) to certain subject matters (data) and are there-
fore drawn towards certain locations within the conceptual space while 
typically – or at least initially – ignoring other locations. 
To return to our chess example. While the combination of a " xed set 
of data and action-rules generates all possible board-positions, some 
board-positions are more likely to be generated than others. Chess play-
ers (or at least human chess players) will use certain guidelines – such as, 
for instance, ‘protect the queen’ – and will not try any permissible move 
at random. Similarly, our minds do not wander blindly in their concep-
tual space but selectively, yielding particular locations. Boden (1990: 89) 
refers to these guidelines as heuristics. They enable any cognitive sys-
tem to move ‘insightfully’ through the conceptual space generated by 
the system. While the various scaff olds that support science enable us to 
overcome these predisposed representations of the world to an import-
ant extent, our genetically wired heuristics (Boyer’s (2000: 277) ‘cate-
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gory-speci! c intuitive principles’ that make up our intuitive ontologies) 
can nevertheless be expected to continue to play a role in our (scienti! c) 
reasoning and therefore bias us against ‘zooming in’ on certain repre-
sentations within our conceptual space. Similarly, as pointed out, the 
way that our senses operate, biases us towards certain representations 
within our conceptual space (makes these easier to reach than others). 
I develop both kinds of biases in the following section.
Next to the ! rst kind of constraint that our biology imposes on our 
science – making some locations within our conceptual space easier to 
reach than others – our biology constrains our sciences in another way. 
This second kind of constraint refers to the points located outside of our 
conceptual space. The fact that our conceptual space contains an in! nite 
amount of representations (given the open-ended nature of forming 
representations) does not mean that there are no locations (possible 
representations) which are outside of our conceptual space. (Much in 
the same way that the fact that there are an in! nite amount of numeri-
cal values between the number 1 and 2 does not mean that there are no 
numerical values outside of that numerical space). Locations outside of 
our conceptual space cannot be reached. 
This yields the following typology of biological constraints on science:
Biological constraints on science
Biased from reaching  Prevented from reaching 
(within our conceptual space) (outside of our conceptual space)
Sensory cause  Cognitive cause  
This, I want to emphasise again, does not mean that some aspects or 
properties of the world must remain unknown. Our conceptual space 
may very well cover everything there is to know in the world, or – at 
least – there is no principled reason why our conceptual space could not 
cover everything there is to be represented. Nor does it mean that we 
are trapped in a subjective, tainted and therefore somehow deformed 
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perspective on the world. As Stove’s (1995) famous rejection of ‘the 
worse argument in the world’ goes, it is not because we have to know the 
world through our conceptual schemes that we cannot know the world in 
itself. We just have a particular way of accessing the world. The fact that 
there can be diff erent ways of knowing the world, is no more problem-
atic than the fact that there are diff erent ways of locomotion (compare 
birds, snakes, " sh and humans). Much as it wouldn’t make any sense to 
argue that we can’t move because our locomotion is constrained by our 
bipedal makeup, it doesn’t make any sense to argue that we can’t know 
because our cognition is constrained by our genetically wired sensory 
and cognitive faculties.
What it does mean is that diff erent ways of knowing the world may 
be possible and that some ways of knowing could be inaccessible to us 
given our biological makeup (much in the same way that some ways of 
locomotion are inaccessible to us given our biology). This point has been 
framed as the ‘hypothesis of the alien scientist’ by Andy Clark (1986) 
and Nicholas Rescher (1990). I discuss it in section 5. In the next section, 
I look at the way that our perceptual and cognitive makeup biases our 
sciences. In other words, I look at the way our genetic makeup makes 
some points easier to reach within our conceptual space than others. 
4. Bias from Representing the World in Particular Ways
4.1 Bias Caused by Our Sensory Apparatus
Through the senses that we have evolved, we receive input from the 
world. However, only a small part of the available stimuli trigger our 
senses. We perceive stimuli only within particular ranges (e.g. our visual 
receptors are sensitive to a narrow portion of the electromagnetic spec-
trum and our auditory receptors to frequencies above 20 Hz and below 
20 kHz), and endowed only with a certain level of resolution4; and, most 
importantly, there are vast realms of potential data in the world for which 
we simply have not evolved the appropriate sensory receptors (e.g. we 
4  The same goes of course for our other senses: taste and smell as well as soma-
to-sensory sensation or touch. We only perceive certain kinds of stimuli and only en-
dowed with a certain level of resolution. 
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do not perceive magnetic ! elds as some migrating birds are known to 
do). This leaves us with a narrow scope on the world (Levine and Shef-
ner 1991). 
Nevertheless, as pointed out, we extend the reach of our senses (i.e. 
scaff old our perceptual abilities) through arti! cial detecting devices, 
allowing us to gather input from the world that falls beyond the scope 
of our ‘naked’ senses. We create telescopes, microscopes, antennas and 
stethoscopes, enabling us to detect otherwise unperceivable entities 
both in the macro- and microscopic realm. Furthermore, rather than 
just increasing the resolution of our senses, we possess devices that 
detect ranges of phenomena we cannot perceive, such as, for instance, 
the invisible part of the electromagnetic spectrum, and the inaudible 
frequencies of sound. Finally, we even detect phenomena for which we 
have no sensory receptors at all, such as air pressure through barometers 
and magnetic ! elds through compasses.
In this regard, we are ever increasing our perceptual scope on the world 
through a process of cumulative cultural evolution which leads to ever 
more powerful sensory extensions. Assuming that the physical world is 
causally closed – i.e. that all entities leave traces on other entities which 
again leave traces on others in an endless chain of causal connections – 
and that there are no epiphenomena – i.e. that there are no phenomena 
which do not exert a physical eff ect – we could, in principle, detect every 
entity and property in the world. While we might not be able to observe 
some aspects of reality directly, if these aspects exert a causal in# uence 
on other aspects, which again change others ad in! nitum, all elements 
in the world could - in principle – eventually ‘surface’, leaving a trace 
that we can gather through observation and its mechanical extensions. 
The narrow scope of our evolved senses do not pose a principled limit to 
what we can detect, since physical entities do not have to be detected by a 
particular sense ‘designed’ to detect it. Light, for instance, can yield audi-
tory stimuli, just as sound can be translated into graphs by a computer. 
 Nevertheless, some entities or properties of the world are easier to 
detect than others. The existence of the sun is much easier to detect 
than the existence of Jupiter’s moons, since we are able to detect the 
former with the naked eye and the latter only with telescopes. Similarly, 
the existence of Jupiter’s moons is easier to detect than the existence of 
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the radiation caused by the big bang, since the latter cannot be detected 
by a ‘simple’ telescope, but requires high-tech radar equipment and 
the proper scienti! c hypothesis – i.e. the birth of the universe in a big 
bang – to explain the particular recording. Therefore, while it might be 
the case that no physical entities are impossible to detect in principle, 
the detection of some entities is rendered much easier than the detection 
of others by the nature of our particular senses.
Detecting instruments, in this sense, are better described as exten-
sion devices of existing senses than radically new and diff erent arti! cial 
senses. In discovering data from the physical world, we start from what 
we gather through our unassisted senses, and extend our reach from 
there. We do not delve into completely diff erent realms of data with these 
instruments at once, but gradually work our way up to more and more 
inaccessible data. Indeed, how could we construct a mechanism that 
detects something of which we are totally ignorant? We can only direct 
our gaze to entities we know or at least have reason to suppose exist. 
This ‘sharpened gaze’ through mechanical detection devices then opens 
us up to the existence of new entities, which again enables us to focus 
our gaze, providing us with a new set of bearings to further direct our 
detection of aspects of the world. 
This provides us with a perceptual bias: some elements will be (rela-
tively) easy to discover, because of their proximity to elements we already 
observe, while others might be extremely hard for us to gather. Diff erent 
senses, in this regard, would provide us with a diff erent set of input that 
we gather through our senses and, therefore, a diff erent perceptual bias, 
making diff erent elements of the world more accessible. Since locations 
within our conceptual space are reached by applying a set of action rules 
to a set of input data, we are biased against reaching those locations 
which require input data from the world we are unlikely to gather because 
of the nature of our sensory apparatus. 
4.2 Bias Caused by Our Cognitive Apparatus
Modern sciences – as pointed out in the introduction – are to an 
important extent at odds with our intuitively based folk theories, such 
as for instance folk physics, mistakenly ascribing an 'impetus' to moving 
objects or, folk biology, ascribing an immutable essence to natural spe-
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cies. Indeed, throughout its history, human science has gradually parted 
ways with our intuitive understanding. While Aristotelian physics is still 
in line with our intuitive grasp of physical happenings, Newtonian – let 
alone Einsteinian – physics contradicts our intuitions. In this context, De 
Cruz and De Smedt (2012) show through an analytical model that cul-
tural transmission of scienti! c knowledge leads toward representations 
that are increasingly more truth-tracking, even when our intuitions on 
the matter are seriously off  the mark. Human science, in this regard, has 
gradually scaff olded its way from the often erroneous, uncritical repre-
sentations we hold in virtue of our cognitive wiring to more truth-ap-
proximating representations of the external world.
Nevertheless, as De Cruz and De Smedt (2007) point out in another 
article, although science has parted ways with what Boyer (2000) dubbed 
our ‘intuitive ontologies’, we can nevertheless expect that they will con-
tinue to play a (distorting) role in scienti! c enquiry, since the human 
mind has evolved to understand objects in the world according to these 
intuitive ontologies (351). Considering the case of scienti! c theories 
about human evolution, De Cruz and De Smedt (2007) argue that not 
only do intuitive ontologies shape intuitions about human evolution, they 
also guide the direction and topics of interest in the research programs. 
In exploring the relationship between intuitive ontologies and the sci-
enti! c discourse surrounding human evolution, De Cruz and De Smedt 
(2007) point at palaeoanthropology, which retraces human evolution 
based on fossil ! ndings. It is, as they point out with Tattersal (2000), 
a discovery rather than theory driven science. The lack of an explicit 
theoretical framework, makes it particularly vulnerable to the distort-
ing eff ect of those so-called (implicit) intuitive ontologies. What indi-
cates that palaeoanthropologists have succumbed to those tacit intuitive 
notions in interpreting the fossil record is because their assumptions 
departed from standard evolutionary theory (the scienti! cally validated 
framework) and became more compatible with such intuitively guiding 
notions.
More particularly, the intuitive notion to which palaeoanthropologists 
have succumbed to, according to De Cruz and De Smedt (2007), is the 
human-nonhuman distinction (358). Making a stark distinction between 
human and non-human is an innate psychological feature natural selec-
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tion endowed us with – as well as most other species – in order to dis-
tinguish conspeci! cs from nonconspeci! cs. This is an important adap-
tation enabling organisms to recognise potential mates, among other 
things. The human-nonhuman distinction, according to De Cruz and De 
Smedt (2007), leads us to exaggerate the diff erence between humans 
and non-human animals and consequently consider human evolution 
as exceptional (358). It has led paleoanthropologists to a unilineal view 
of human evolution. 
Mayr (1950: 115-116), for instance, argued that all hominids can be 
grouped in a single lineage from australopithecines through Homo habi-
lis to Homo sapiens. This is in sharp contrast with the usual branching 
pattern of evolution, and was explained away by Mayr by invoking the 
fact that hominids did not speciate because, possessing culture, they 
occupied more ecological niches than any other species (De Cruz and 
De Smedt 2007: 359). This is inconsistent with the ! nding of Homo 
# oresiensis, a small hominid with the brain size of an australopithecine 
dated at 18.000 years B.C., and many more genera within the hominid 
linea in the last decades (most recently Homo naledi in a South-Afri-
can cave – Berger et al 2015). Nevertheless, paleoanthropologists still 
attempt to prune the tree of human evolution (De Cruz and De Smedt 
2007: 361). While there might of course be other non-biological reasons 
for this apparently systematic bias in palaeoanthropology – cultural rea-
sons, such as the in# uence of cultural anthropology, stressing the pivotal 
importance of culture in explaining all things human on Mayr (De Cruz 
and De Smedt 2007: 360) and Mayr’s in# uence on the next generations 
of researchers – it is likely that implicit intuitive notions were (and to 
some extent still are) at work.
Therefore, while we are able to transcend our commonsense repre-
sentations or ‘folk sciences’ – i.e. go beyond and in some cases against 
these representations – the intuitive ontologies at the core of these rep-
resentations still seem to play a role in the scienti! c representations 
we produce. As suggested by De Cruz and De Smedt (2007), intuitive 
ontologies are pervasive in scienti! c discourse, directing research and 
biasing the interpretation of experimental results. In this sense, much 
as our senses bias us against detecting certain elements of the world 
and therefore bias us against zooming in on certain representations of 
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the world, our cognitive nature biases us against interpreting the data in 
certain ways. In terms of the framework introduced above: we are biased 
against forming representations which would require pathways through 
our conceptual space we are not likely to take, still guided as we are by 
the heuristics natural selection provided us with.
5. The Alien Scientist Hypothesis
Science, I have argued above, has radically transcended our default or 
natural view of the world, extending our cognitive scope way beyond its 
humble origins: the Uexküllian ‘Umwelt’ we were endowed with much 
like any other species on this planet. The key drivers behind sciences’ 
extension of our cognitive scope beyond the human Umwelt, are the 
various scaff olds discussed in section 2. Those instruments and cogni-
tive artefacts however do not materialise out of thin air. In this regard, 
whereas those artefacts enable us to radically transcend the intuitive 
representations we hold in virtue of our cognitive makeup, they are 
themselves constrained by our genetically wired cognitive mechanisms. 
Ruse (1986), in this context, argues that while the products of science 
(i.e. the representations or theories it produces) transcend their organic 
origin (the functions our cognitive faculties were ‘designed’ to carry out 
by natural selection), the methods science employs and the principles it 
adheres to are still " rmly rooted in our biology. Our scienti" c endeav-
ours, in other words, as far as they can take us away from our uncritical 
commonsense representations, still # ow through ‘biologically channeled 
modes of thinking’ imposed on us by evolution (149). 
Ruse (1986) refers to these innate reasoning patterns underlying all 
human thought as ‘epigenetic rules’. This term, borrowed from Lums-
den and Wilson (1981), designates the biological constraints on human 
cognition and behaviour which have their origin in evolutionary needs 
(Ruse 1986: 143). A good example of such rules is the universal human 
classi" catory schema into which colours are broken up (143-144), or the 
incest barriers we " nd in all human cultures (145-146). Culture, Ruse 
argues, is not some special disembodied phenomenon but ‘the # esh on 
a biological skeleton’, where the bones of that skeleton are epigenetic 
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rules, controlled by our genetic constitution and fashioned by the hand 
of natural selection (147). 
Those epigenetic rules include the cognitive ingredients at our dis-
posal; the building blocks of human reasoning. According to Ruse, they 
are the basic logical principles we adhere to in our reasoning, such as 
the law of the excluded middle and of non-contradiction, or the rule of 
modus ponens and alternation (Ruse 1986: 156-157).5 Furthermore, 
they include the basic premises and principles of mathematical thinking, 
our ability to draw causal relations, inductive and deductive reasoning, 
and so on (158).
All human thinking, from the uncritical folk sciences we produce to 
the most advanced and counterintuitive scienti! c conjectures, employs 
these basic ‘cognitive building blocks’. In other words, the cognitive 
artefacts we develop and which radically increase our conceptual abili-
ties, are nevertheless still constructed out of a set of conceptual tools, 
which are ultimately the product of our genetically determined cognitive 
apparatus. In the same way, we cannot experience the world other than 
through our particular senses; we cannot think other than through those 
reasoning patterns evolution has provided us with. Being the products of 
a natural, unguided process, the cognitive building blocks at the basis 
of human reasoning are contingent in much the same way as the expe-
riential realms yielded by our senses. In this regard, just as we could 
perceive the world diff erently, we could – in theory at least – conceptu-
alise it diff erently.
The way we represent the world is highly dependent on the particular 
evolutionary path we have taken. While this is trivially true on an intuitive, 
hard-wired ‘Umwelt’ level (the underlying physical intuitions of a water 
born ! sh can be expected to be radically diff erent than ours, given that 
5  I am aware that this is a controversial point. Many philosophers, most notably Frege 
(1884), have argued against this so-called ‘psychologism’. Logic (and by extension math-
ematics) cannot, according to Frege, be explained by psychology. In other words, the 
foundations of logic and mathematical are not cognitive in nature. Quine’s (1969) nat-
uralism has famously taken a diametrically opposed stance. According to Quine, epis-
temology is to be a ‘chapter of psychology’ (1969). This paper is rooted in the latter, 
naturalistic tradition, It takes a cognitive (and evolutionary) perspective on epistemology. 
Defending such a naturalistic approach (or even reviewing the arguments in favour of 
such an approach) is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
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they evolved to cope with a radically diff erent environment than ours), 
it also holds for our scienti" c representations. Let us suppose, in this 
regard, that we did not possess the innate faculty to represent numeri-
cal information. According to Spelke (2003) there are two distinct innate 
systems at the basis of our ability to represent numbers. With respect to 
small numbers (up to about 3) we are endowed with the innate faculty to 
represent the numerical identity exactly, as well as the eff ects of adding 
or subtracting one. With respect to larger sets of numbers, we repre-
sent their approximate numerical magnitudes, enabling us for instance 
to gauge that a set of 50 is larger than a set of 25 (but not that a set of 
31 is larger than a set of 30) (297). Spelke argues that these two dis-
tinct systems of representation are then combined by the human mind, 
underlying our ability to represent larger numbers exactly and therefore 
to count and engage in more complex mathematics (302)6. Without these 
innate faculties underlying our sense of numeracy, it is likely that we 
could never have developed mathematics. Lacking this powerful cogni-
tive artefact, in turn, most of the scienti" c representations of the world 
we now hold, would be unreachable.
Conversely, a creature that would be endowed with more or diff erent 
cognitive building blocks, could possibly construct radically diff erent 
representations that are inaccessible to human beings. A creature with 
such extra reasoning patterns could look upon us in much the same way 
as we would look upon those numeracy-lacking humans: as blinded to 
some ways of representing the world. Grounding our cognitive faculties 
in a natural process, we must indeed admit to the theoretical possibility 
of radically diff erent cognitive faculties. 
This point was eloquently framed by Clark (1986) and Rescher (1990) 
as the hypothesis of alien scientists or epistemologists. According to 
Clark, an ‘interesting consequence’ of an evolutionary take on cognition 
6  This innate number sense does not mean that human will automatically develop 
a full-# edged numerical system. It is a necessary condition, not a suffi  cient condition. 
Famously, the Pirahã (an Amazonian tribe) only have the number 1 and 2 and a term to 
designate small quantities and one to designate large quantities. Moreover, when cultures 
do develop full-# edged numerical systems they can diff er. Mesopotamians did not have a 
decimal number system, but one centered on 60. Nevertheless, I would argue with Spelke 
(2003), that despite the cultural diff erences in constructing numerical systems, they are 
all rooted in an innate sense of number.
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is that we must accept the possibility of alien epistemologists, working 
successfully with a diff erent and – to us – possibly unintelligible model 
of our ‘common reality’. Indeed, he continues, ‘the ideal limit of human 
scienti" c enquiry is still not the only possible ‘correct’ representation 
of reality even if relative to our cognitive constraints and observational 
access there are no visible alternatives’ (158). 
Similarly, Rescher (1990) argues that ‘there is no categorical assurance 
that [alien] intelligent creatures will think alike in a common world, any 
more than they will act alike – that is, there is no reason why cognitive 
adaptations should be any more uniform than behavioral adaptations’ 
(his italics, 92). Sciences, he continues, ‘are bound to vary with the cogni-
tive instruments available in the physical constitution and mental equip-
ment of their developers’ (95). Our sciences, in this regard, are but the 
intellectual product of one particular sort of cognitive life-form. They 
are ultimately species-relative (95). 
Rescher concludes that ‘it would be grossly unimaginative to think that 
either the journey or the destination must be the same – or even sub-
stantially similar’ and that ‘unless we narrow our intellectual horizons in 
a parochially anthropomorphic way, we must be prepared to recognize 
the great likelihood that the ‘science’ and ‘technology’ of a remote civi-
lization would be something very diff erent from science and technology 
as we know it’ (94).
In reference to the framework developed in this paper, some theo-
retically possible ways of representing the world can be expected to be 
located outside of our conceptual space. Such hypothetical alien sci-
entists could yield representations which are irremediably beyond our 
ken. Denying this – I believe with Rescher (1990) – would be hopelessly 
anthropocentric. Nevertheless, this would still not entail that they would 
represent objects and properties of the world which we cannot represent. 
Those objects and properties might indeed very well be representable 
in more than one way. Some ways may not be accessible to us, but oth-
ers might. Representational closure therefore does not entail cognitive 
closure. Compare this with language. The fact that we only master one 
or a few languages does not necessarily entail that we cannot express 
certain ideas, merely that in expressing them we are constrained to the 
particular language we happen to speak. 






ate | 3/26/18 11:56 AM
Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science 18, 2017
Center for the Philosophy of Sciences of Lisbon University
How Our Biology Constrains Our Science
50
6. Concluding Remarks
While an increasing number of naturalistic authors point out biological 
constraints on human science, it remains unclear how exactly we should 
understand these constraints. In this paper, I have proposed a typology 
of those biological constraints. There are two ways in which our biology 
constrains our sciences. The ! rst way is by making some representa-
tions within our conceptual space easier to reach than others. The sec-
ond way is by de! ning a conceptual space and consequently preventing 
access to representations outside of that space. This classi! cation and 
the implications I have outlined for each kind of constraint will, I hope, 
both ward off  possible confusion and unfounded conclusions regarding 
our epistemic prospects by lumping all relevant issues together as con-
straints or limitations.
In this regard, brie# y coming back to the issue of cognitive closure – 
the thesis that some aspects and properties of the world must in principle 
elude us given the constraints imposed on science by our perceptual and 
cognitive faculties – it should be clear that this is neither established by 
the fact that we are biased towards certain representations within our 
conceptual space, nor by the fact that humanly possible representations 
are contained within a conceptual space. Bias, by its very nature, is not 
an unsurmountable obstacle, and containment within a conceptual space 
and the possibility of radically diff erent – and to us – unintelligible repre-
sentations of the world, let’s say by Clark and Rescher’s alien scientists, 
does not entail that some aspects or properties of the world fall outside 
of our cognitive scope (merely that some theoretically possible ways of 
accessing those aspects or properties are outside of our reach). 
Finally, I dare hope, the typology I propose could facilitate the sys-
tematic study of cognitive and perceptual constraints on human scien-
ti! c representations of the world. This project should be of interest to 
philosophers and scientists alike. It is squarely rooted in the age-old 
epistemological quest to gauge the scope and limits of human knowl-
edge in the face of sceptical threats. But it is also relevant for scientists, 
who deal with these constraints on a daily basis in their constant strive 
to further knowledge and expand the boundaries of our scienti! c scope.
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